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Extractivisma b s t r a c t
In recent years, Large Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLA), direct land tenure changes have been gaining
momentum in developing countries. In this study, we evaluate the potential extent to which agricultural
land deals in Africa are able to address the host countries’ food security needs, a commonly cited moti-
vation for their establishment. First, we develop a framework to evaluate the priority food security needs
of 38 African countries in 2000 based on indicators of food availability, accessibility, stability, and utiliza-
tion. Second, we estimate whether the crops from land deals would be sold on export or local food mar-
kets based on the origin of investments (domestic, foreign or mixed), type of investors (eg. agribusiness,
finance, or government) and the intended crops (eg. food, cash crop, or biofuel). This enables us to esti-
mate how likely the investment is to improve in-country food security, versus serving other purposes
(e.g., speculation, enclosure of natural resources). Third, we account for the characteristics of the loca-
tions where the deals happen (population density, land cover and distance to markets) in order to esti-
mate the level of conflict and deforestation that they could exacerbate. We find that LSLA are only likely
to address the identified food security needs of 7 countries. LSLA are also at risk of increasing land pres-
sures and conflicts or deforestation on 83% of the acquired area, including in countries where they could
meet food security needs. We also find that the more productive lands are most often allocated to flex
crops, while food crops are produced on more marginal lands. We thus argue that even when their pur-
pose is agricultural production, most LSLA are not likely to improve food security; rather, they often serve
the financial interests of transnational companies and local elites with the support of host governments.
Finally, we recommend agricultural investments to be elaborated in consultation with local communities
and marginalized groups to sustainably support their socio-ecological systems.
 2021 The Author(s). Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
Humanity faces the major challenge of sustainably feeding the
world while avoiding additional greenhouse gas emissions in a
shrinking land area per capita. Despite an increase in global food
production over the past two decades, nearly 690 million people
(about 9% of the global population) remain undernourished glob-
ally, of which 250 million (36%) live in Africa (FAO, IFAD, UNICEF,
WFP, & WHO, 2020; Foley et al., 2011). The Millennium Develop-
ment Goal’s (MDG) target of halving the number of undernour-
ished people by 2015 has been met in 72 developing countries
(FAO, IFAD, & WFP, 2015). However, even though humans produce
enough food for the current global population, geopolitics and glo-
bal economics hinder its equal distribution (FAO et al., 2020;Vivero-pol, 2017). Today 53 countries, mostly in Asia and Africa,
still struggle to feed their populations and require international
food aid due to high volatility of food prices, lack of access to food
in the poorest regions, and political crises hindering economic
development (FAO et al., 2015; FSIN, 2019).
Looking ahead, food security remains in the top priorities for
the Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) with a new target of
‘‘Zero Hunger” for 2030 (Porter et al., 2014; United Nations,
2016). Achieving this goal is challenging in light of the need to feed
more people from the expected increasing global population
(United Nations, 2017), as well as potential negative impacts of cli-
mate change on agricultural production. Moreover, the current
COVID-19 pandemic with its negative economic impacts, as well
as the recent large scale Desert Locus outbreaks in Eastern Africa
are expected to increase the number of undernourished people
by 83 to 132 million by the end of 2020 (FAO et al., 2020). This
poses considerable doubts on our ability to achieve the Zero
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the undernourishment trend that has been on the rise since 2014
(FAO et al., 2020).
In an effort to increase food production in developing countries
with high yield gaps, agricultural investments (in machinery, irri-
gation, fertilizers, and pesticides) have been pushed forward to
modernize agriculture and increase yields (UNCTAD, 2009; World
Bank, 2007). In recent years however, these investments have
grown to include Large Scale Land Acquisitions (LSLA) in the form
of direct land lease or ownership investments (Anseeuw et al.,
2012; Cotula, Vermeulen, Leonard, & Keeley, 2009; De Schutter,
2011b; UNCTAD, 2009; Zoomers, 2010).
Recent work shows that LSLA have been targeting densely pop-
ulated, easily accessible and oftentimes agricultural areas rather
than remote idle lands (Messerli, Giger, Dwyer, Breu, & Eckert,
2014). This has posed concerns over the potential environmental
and social impacts from LSLA, including deforestation (Conigliani,
Cu, & Agostino, 2018; Davis et al., 2020) and changes in access to
water resources (Johansson, Fader, Seaquist, & Nicholas, 2016;
Rulli, Saviori, & Odorico, 2012). Agricultural expansion from LSLA,
has also caused land conflicts between farmers and pastoralists
(Oberlack, Tejada, Messerli, Rist, & Giger, 2016; Soeters, Weesie,
& Zoomers, 2017), decreased overall employment due to mecha-
nization, increased the casualization of agricultural labor associ-
ated with lower incomes and insecurity (Li, 2011; Nolte &
Ostermeier, 2017; Yaro, Teye, & Torvikey, 2017), and did not ade-
quately promote investments in needed rural infrastructure such
as roads, water or sanitation (Nolte, Chamberlain, & Giger, 2016).
Achieving food security has been commonly cited as motivation
for LSLA through closing yield gaps, expanding agricultural areas
and fostering rural development (Deininger et al., 2010; World
Bank, 2007). Yet the current research on LSLA has only recently
started to account for impacts on food security in host countries
(Nyantakyi-Frimpong & Kerr, 2017; Rulli & D’Odorico, 2014;
Yengoh & Armah, 2015). Other studies have attempted to assess
the linkages and spillover effects these deals might have on the
surrounding communities, specifically in terms of employment
and capacity transfer (Deininger & Xia, 2016; Glover & Jones,
2019). These analyses are however often either limited to case
studies or only focus on the production dimension of food security.
By introducing a multidimensional set of indicators, the FAO
has highlighted that food security is constrained by availability,
accessibility, stability and utilization rather than production alone
(FAO IFAD & WFP, 2013). As such, research on LSLA’s impacts on
food security should address all these aspects. To date, Rulli &
D’Odorico (2014) estimated that by closing yield gaps, land acqui-
sitions could in theory feed an additional 211.7 million people in
Africa, which is more than the number of currently undernour-
ished people in the continent (FAO, 2019). Nevertheless, when
the authors consider that 50% of the palm oil and sugar cane pro-
duction might be used for biofuels, this number is reduced to
132.6 million (Rulli & D’Odorico, 2014). The authors have however
failed to consider the use of maize and soybean for biofuel and
feedstock (Borras, Franco, Isakson, Levidow, & Vervest, 2014;
Sorda, Banse, & Kemfert, 2010), or the fact that a large portion of
the production in the continent is destined for export.
In this study, we introduce a food security score based on all
four dimensions and use it to identify priority needs at the country
level. To the best of our knowledge, we present for the first time an
assessment of the destination markets of land deals, as well as the
socio-economic and environmental risks associated with LSLA at a
continental scale. In doing so, we evaluate if and how agricultural
land deals address the food security needs of the 38 African coun-
tries in which they occur by answering the following questions: 1.
What was the state of food security in 2000 and what were the pri-
ority food security needs for the 38 African countries studied? 2.2
How likely are the crops grown on the acquired lands to contribute
to the host countries’ food security? 3. What potential land distur-
bances could LSLA cause at the local level?
First, we identify the food security needs of countries by evalu-
ating the status of all four dimensions in 2000. Second, we estimate
the destination of crops produced through analyzing the origin of
investment (domestic, foreign or mixed), type of investors (e.g.,
agribusiness, finance, government), and the type of crops (e.g., food
stuff, cash crop, biofuel) intended for production on the acquired
land. This enables us to determine whether LSLA have the capacity
to address the identified food security needs of countries. Third, we
consider the potential contribution of LSLA to land pressure or
deforestation (measured by distance to markets, population den-
sity and previous land cover).2. Data and methods
2.1. Agricultural land deals in Africa
We used the new version of the Land Matrix dataset as of 1st
March 2019 (The Land Matrix Global Observatory, 2019). We col-
lected all concluded deals (that did not fail) intended for agricul-
ture or biofuel production in Africa. The vast majority of these
deals cover an area larger than 200Ha due to this threshold being
set by the Land Matrix (The Land Matrix Global Observatory,
2019). These deals also included domestic actors as unique inves-
tors. We count 498 deals by 504 investors aimed for the production
of 81 different crops on a contracted area of around 8.8 MHa (larger
than the size of Austria) hosted by 38 African countries between
2000 and 2015 (the remaining 16 African countries had no data
on agricultural land deals, and thus are assumed not to host any).2.2. Identifying the food security needs of targeted African countries
We first established a baseline of the status of food security of
each studied country in 2000 and then identified their priority food
security needs. The year 2000 was chosen as a baseline of the food
security status of countries because it is the starting date of land
acquisitions reported in the Land Matrix dataset used in this study.
Since we aim to assess the potential contribution of LSLA to the
food security needs of the countries where they occur, it is impor-
tant to identify those needs at the time these investments started.
Nevertheless, we do acknowledge that the food security situation
across the continent has changed over the past two decades, and
include a similar evaluation of food insecurity severity and priority
needs for 2017 (extracted from FAOSTAT on February 17th, 2020).
We used two indicators for each of FAO’s four dimensions of
food security, and scored each dimension between 0 and 2 based
on the number of indicators passing thresholds mostly derived
from the SDGs (FAO IFAD & WFP, 2013; United Nations, 2016)
(Table 1). We used the domestic supply of vegetables and fruits
rather than the share of cereals and tubers as a proxy for the avail-
ability of nutritional food in the countries, because the share of
cereals alone does not indicate what other components make up
the rest of the diet. We set a threshold of 400 g/day of fruits and
vegetables for a diversified diet as per the recommendations of
the WHO (WHO, 2003). We also constructed an index approximat-
ing food affordability whereby we considered food to be affordable
when the prevalence of undernourishment was lower than that of
poverty (at national poverty line) suggesting that a portion of poor
people manage to gain access to sufficient food. We assessed self-
sufficiency by deducting the imported calories from the average
dietary energy supply adequacy, rather than using the share of
imported cereals indicator from the FAO suite. As no threshold
was found in the literature for estimating import capacity, we
Table 1
Selected food security indicators and thresholds to assess FAO’s four dimensions of
food security in 38 African countries (FAO, 2018; United Nations, 2016) (see SI 1 for
details).
Dimension Indicator Threshold Source





1.2 Domestic supply of
vegetables and fruits
(g/day/capita)
400 g (WHO, 2003)





2.2 Affordability index >0 own assumption








Stability 4.1 Self-sufficiency 95% Inspired by
(United Nations,
2016)
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exports for Africa in 2012 as a threshold (FAO, 2019).
We considered a country to be relatively food secure if it fulfills
at least the average dietary energy supply adequacy threshold, one
of the stability thresholds and a prevalence of undernourishment
below 10%. Countries with negative affordability index, prevalence
of undernourishment 30%, or insufficient average dietary energy
supply were considered as severely food insecure. The rest of the
countries were considered moderately food insecure.
As nutritional value is more based on intake than availability,
and utilization is difficult to relate to LSLA, we prioritized the food
security needs of countries based first on availability (sufficient
calories), then accessibility, stability and lastly utilization. This also
stems from the fact that most of the continent has issues with uti-
lization. Indeed, for the 38 countries studied here, over 30% of the
population did not have access to safe water in 26 countries and to
improved sanitation facilities in 35 countries in 2000 (FAO, 2019).
For stability, we further distinguished between countries that
should actively pursue higher levels of self-sufficiency as opposed
to relying on imports. According to Clapp (2017), these include
poor countries with high food insecurity, net food importers with
sufficient agricultural land, volatile export earners dependent on
a small number of suppliers for their staple foods, and countries
that are politically unstable or with a large population. We used
results from Fader et al. (2013) to identify countries where self-
sufficiency is limited by natural resource availability and used
the UNCTAD dataset to determine if countries have sufficiently
diversified export earnings (UNCTAD, 2019b).2.3. Estimating the destination market of the production from land
acquisitions
Based on the crops intended for production and the types of
investors, we estimated the likelihood of the production to be sold
on local, export or both markets; thus informing on the ability of
deals to increase food availability (indicators 1.1 and 4.1), produce
more diversified crops (indicator 1.2) or increase export revenues
(indicator 4.2).
As the Land Matrix reports 81 different intended crops and 540
investors, we reclassified both crops and investors into fewer
groups for analysis. We first classified intended crops into the main
food groups: cereals (including wheat, maize, rice), roots and3
tubers (including cassava and potatoes), legumes and pulses (in-
cluding beans, peas and lentils), vegetables and fruits (including
onions, tomatoes and apples), oils and sugars, livestock and feed,
and finally cash crops (including jatropha, coffee and rubber)
(Table S1). Since most of the deals include more than one crop,
we further simplified this classification by distinguishing between
food and flex crops. Food crops are those cereals, legumes, tubers
and vegetables that are used as food, while flex crops such as
maize, soybeans, oils and sugars can also be used as feed or fuel
(Borras et al., 2014). Deals only concerning cash crops, biofuels
and/or trees were all grouped as cash crops and were considered
as not food since they do not increase calorie intake and they are
mostly produced for export (Table S1) (Borras & Franco, 2012;
Cotula et al., 2009).
We then classified investor origin by first distinguishing
between domestic and foreign (where at least one investor is not
from the host country) investors (Fig. S2 a). We then used the
information on investors provided by the Land Matrix and distin-
guished between private, stock-exchange listed, state-owned com-
panies, investment funds, individual entrepreneurs, and Non-Profit
Organizations (NPO) (Fig. S2b). We complemented this classifica-
tion by our own internet searches for companies based on their
main sector of activity: agriculture (39% of acquired land), finance
(25%), government (6%) and others (including energy, construction
and infrastructure and forestry companies, tourism and conserva-
tion institutions as well as NGOs) (Fig. S2c).
We used the information on intended markets (available from
the Land Matrix in 65% of the deals) in combination with the types
of crops and investors as a training dataset for the random tree
classification algorithm of the Weka software (Hall et al., 2009).
The algorithm calculates the probability of a deal’s production to
be intended for local, export or both markets based on any occur-
ring crop/investor combination and extrapolates to those deals
where the market destination is unknown (Table 2). For example,
we find that 90% of the deals involving domestic, state-owned
agribusinesses producing food crops supply local markets, so we
consider any other deals with this combination for which the des-
tination market is unknown to also supply local markets (Table 2).
Acknowledging the level of uncertainty related to this approach,
resulting in a 75% market attribution accuracy, we reclassified the
final market predictions based on three scenarios. The ‘‘most like-
ly” scenario follows the algorithms’ classification. The ‘‘local ori-
ented” scenario adds deals classified as ‘‘export” with a
probability lower than 1 to the deals contributing to the local food
market. Finally, the ‘‘export oriented” scenario only considers deals
classified as ‘‘local” with a probability of 1 to contribute to the local
market. Furthermore, we treat deals aimed at flex crop production
and classified as ‘‘local” differently based on each scenario. For the
‘‘most likely” scenario, we consider that only half the area covered
by these flex crop deals contributes to local food markets under the
‘‘most likely” scenario, 75% for the ‘‘local oriented” and 25% for the
‘‘export oriented” one. Finally, as the main aim is to assess whether
or not LSLA can contribute to food security rather than the actual
extent of their contribution, we assume that all the contracted land
is utilized, even though the area under production is generally
lower than the acquired area (The Land Matrix Global
Observatory, 2019).
2.4. Assessing the potential contribution of land deals in addressing the
food security needs of African countries
We evaluated what contribution agricultural land acquisitions
might have in addressing the priority food security needs of host
countries based on the destination market of the production. We
assumed that if the production is destined to local food markets,
it could increase food availability (indicator 1.1) and the country’s
Table 2
Visualization of the probabilistic assessment for market prediction based on the various crops and investors involved. Colors represent the most probable destination market.
Numbers refer to the probability of deals to be destined for the market indicated by the color.
Table 3
Potential levels of land pressure caused by deals depending on locations where they
occur (land cover, distance to markets and population density).
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sification in a country if it is intended to produce fruits and vegeta-
bles or livestock (indicator 1.2). On the other hand, if production is
destined to export markets, we assumed that it would only directly
contribute to increasing the import capacity of a country (indicator
4.2).
Unfortunately, at this level of aggregation and without field
data, it is impossible to assess the direct impacts of LSLA on acces-
sibility (through income) or utilization (through infrastructure
building). We thus assumed that the land deals might not be
needed to improve food security in countries that are relatively
food secure. However, in the countries where accessibility is to
be prioritized, we assumed that if food is affordable (indicator
2.2), then the issue might be related to a lack of physical access
to food, in which case only deals contributing to local markets
could improve accessibility by hopefully producing more food or
creating markets in more remote areas. In the case that food is
not affordable, then both market destinations could potentially
contribute to accessibility either as a result of lower food prices
from increased availability or attributed to higher incomes associ-
ated with exports. We are aware that these assumptions might not
hold true in cases where exports displace local food production
thus requiring higher imports that might be more expensive, or
that higher incomes from exports are not necessarily accrued by
the more vulnerable farmers (Manda, Tallontire, & Dougill, 2020),
or even that local food produced from LSLA might be of higher
value and thus less affordable to the poorest households. However,
as we are unable to assess these impacts at such a large scale, we
classified the contribution to food security in countries suffering
from economic accessibility issues as unclear.
2.5. Assessing the extent of potential land disturbances in the areas
where deals occur
Regardless of the potential benefits to food security at national
level, LSLA have direct impacts on people and the environment in
the locations where they occur. We thus evaluated the potential
impacts of deals in terms of land pressures and deforestation based
on the land cover in 2000, proximity to markets, and population
density surrounding the deals’ locations. Locations were defined4
as a 10Km buffer around the exact location provided by the Land
Matrix for the 127 deals (26%) where the coordinates were avail-
able. For the remaining deals where the administrative region
was provided, we set the 2nd level of administrative division as
the buffer zone http://www.gadm.org, and finally we set the 11
deals with only the country as location to not available.
Following the approach used by Deininger (2011) and Messerli
et al. (2014), land cover was classified as grassland, forest, cropland
and sparsely vegetated. In 40% of the deals, previous land cover
was provided by the Land Matrix, which we complemented with
extracted land cover in 2000 from a satellite-based land cover pro-
duct for the remaining locations (ESA, 2017). Proximity to the clos-
est urban area with over 50,000 people was assumed to be
accessible for a trip of 6 h or less, otherwise the location was
deemed remote (Nelson, 2008). Finally, an area was considered
as densely populated after exceeding 25 people/Km2, else it was
sparsely populated (CIESIN, 2016). These spatial datasets were
then aggregated by buffer zones to characterize the majority land
cover, average accessibility, and average population density of a
deal’s location.
We considered deals to cause minimal land pressure if they tar-
geted remote, sparsely populated and sparsely vegetated or grass-
lands areas (blue in Table 3) (Cotula et al., 2009; Deininger, 2011;
Messerli et al., 2014). However, if deals targeted densely populated
or accessible grasslands areas or croplands, then they would likely
displace smallholder farmers and pastoralists, increase pressures
on land, and could even result in violent conflicts (Cotula et al.,
2009; Deininger, 2011; Messerli et al., 2014). Finally, deals that tar-
geted forested areas were classified separately as causing defor-
estation (Table 3). In cases where deals targeted multiple
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between all locations.
3. Results
3.1. Food security needs of African countries in 2000
Food insecurity was widespread for most studied African coun-
tries in 2000. Apart from utilization, only 10 countries passed at
least one threshold per food security dimension in 2000 and Ethio-
pia did not pass any (Fig. 1a, Fig. S3, Table S2).
In terms of availability, Morocco, Egypt, Cameroon, Gabon, and
São Tomé and Principe (STP) reached the thresholds for both calo-
rie sufficiency and nutrition in 2000 (Fig. 1a), while Rwanda was
the only country with nutritious food but insufficient caloric avail-
ability. Ethiopia, Central African Republic (CAR), Angola, Zambia
and Zimbabwe also had insufficient calories available to feed their
populations (Fig. 1a). These six countries are thus considered
severely food insecure and need to prioritize increasing food avail-
ability (Fig. 1b, Table S2).
For accessibility, Egypt and South Africa were the only countries
with affordable food and prevalence of undernourishment below
5% in 2000 (Fig. 1a). In the other countries, the prevalence of
undernourishment exceeded 5% but remained below the preva-
lence of poverty, suggesting that poor people were somewhat able
to afford to pay for food if they have physical access to it. Amongst
these countries however, the level of undernourishment is uneven:
below 10% of the population in Morocco, Gabon and Nigeria but
exceeds 30% in nine countries (CAR, Mozambique, Tanzania, Mada-
gascar, Kenya, Congo, Cameroon, Liberia and Sierra Leone) consid-
ered severely insecure and in need to prioritize food accessibility
(Fig. 1b).
Almost all African countries had utilization problems in 2000
(Fig. 1a). No country provided universal access to improved sani-
tation for its population, and only Egypt and Mauritius provided
access to improved water to above 95% of their populations
(Fig. S3).Fig. 1. (a) Food security scores based on number of indicators passing thresholds (see Ta
needs per country (based on the dimension scores) and the severity of food insecurity (
people).
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Côte d’Ivoire (CIV), Ghana, Nigeria, Malawi and South Africa
were the only countries to fulfill both stability thresholds, and
Benin, Egypt, Ghana, Mali and Uganda were the only self-
sufficient countries in 2000 (Fig. 1a). This means that the rest
are dependent on food imports to fulfill the dietary energy supply
threshold when they have limited import capacity (except for
Angola, Congo, Gabon, Zambia and Zimbabwe) (Fig. 1a). As such,
these countries need to prioritize self-sufficiency, not only to sup-
port spending their national budget on non-food needs, but also to
avoid being vulnerable to international food price shocks (Clapp,
2017). The only exceptions are Guinea-Bissau, Mauritius, Morocco,
Namibia and The Gambia that do not possess sufficient land and
water resources to be self-sufficient and would have to improve
their import capacity while also increasing production (Fader
et al., 2013).
Finally, we find that while most indicator values changed over
the past two decades, they only contributed to a change in food
insecurity severity in 11 countries (seven improvements) and to
a change in priority needs in 17 countries (Fig. S4). While the num-
ber of severely food insecure countries decreased, Ghana, Mali and
South Africa are the only countries to be considered as relatively
food secure in 2017; as Egypt lost its stability status and the pro-
portion of undernourishment exceeded 10% of the population in
Nigeria and Gabon (Fig. S4). Uganda is the only country to have
become severely food insecure in 2017. Moreover, while accessibil-
ity is still a major issue to be prioritized in the continent, stability
has become the most common priority need (Fig. S4).
3.2. Deals contribution to the food security needs of host countries
Overall, the land allocated for producing food crops (roots and
tubers, fruits and vegetables and cereals) and livestock by LSLA
represented 35% of the acquired area in the continent (Fig. S1b)
with only 14% intended for either livestock, fruits, or vegetables
(Fig. S1b) needed for a diversified and nutritious diet which is lack-
ing in Africa overall (Willett et al., 2019). Instead, the acquisitions
in the continent were mostly targeting flex crops (41% in Fig. S1b)ble 1) for each food security dimension in 2000. (b) Identified priority food security
based on the sufficiency of available calories and the proportion of undernourished
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Franco, 2012; Borras et al., 2014) and cash crops (22% in
Fig. S1b), both mostly intended for export (Table 2).
We found that all the deals in Benin, The Gambia, Morocco,
Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau and Swaziland were intended for export
or non-food markets, while no country exclusively hosted deals
targeting local food markets (Fig. 2a, Table S2). Instead, the tar-
geted area by LSLA was mostly intended for non-food crops or
export markets in 19 countries (including Cameroon, Angola and
Ethiopia) and mostly for local food markets in six countries (in-
cluding Mauritania, Mali and South Africa) (Fig. 2a, Table S2). In
the remaining seven countries, deals were found to supply both
markets almost equally (between 40% and 60%). These results
reflect the most likely scenario and only differ for seven countries
when considering the ‘‘export oriented” or ‘‘local oriented” scenar-
ios (Fig. S5). Indeed, most of the acquired land in Burkina Faso was
only destined for export under the ‘‘export oriented” scenario, and
for local food markets only under the ‘‘local oriented” scenario in
CIV, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia (Fig. S5).
As such, based on the most targeted markets, we found that
land deals are only capable of addressing the priority food security
needs of seven out of the 38 countries where they occur. These
include countries with stability issues such as Morocco and Mauri-
tius that could improve their import capacity by targeting export
markets and those like Burkina Faso and Mauritania that could
improve their self-sufficiency status through deals intended for
local food markets (Fig. 2b, Table S2). LSLA are however found to
be inappropriate in 14 countries including the severely undernour-
ished ones with insufficient food availability such as Ethiopia and
Angola (Fig. 2b, Table S2). Deals in these countries mostly target-
ing export markets not only oppose their needs, but risk aggravat-
ing an already dire situation. Finally, LSLA’s contribution is less
clear for the 14 countries that need to prioritize accessibility and
utilization (Fig. 2b, Table S2).
3.3. Potential local impacts of the land deals
Land deals covering 83% of the acquired area were likely to
compete with existing croplands or grassland used for grazing orFig. 2. (a) Market attribution of the majority of acquired area in each country (based on
LSLA to contribute to the identified food security needs of countries (based on countrie
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forest, and/or put pressure on densely populated areas potentially
leading to conflicts as they were located in densely populated,
easily accessible agricultural or forested regions (Fig. 3, Table S2).
Indeed, across the continent, existing croplands are the most tar-
geted land cover (48%) followed by forests (31%) mostly for the
production of flex crops, and marginal lands (14%) and grasslands
(5%) for the production of food crops (Fig. S6). All land deals were
likely to lead to high land pressures in the areas where they
occurred in Mauritania, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, Benin, Rwanda,
Malawi, Swaziland and South Africa and to deforestation in
Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Principe (Fig. 3a, Table S2). Only
in Morocco and Namibia did all the deals potentially cause low
land pressures and over half of the acquired land in Egypt and
Sudan occurred in areas leading to low land pressures (Fig. 3a,
Table S2). Unfortunately, due to lack of location data, it was not
possible to assess the level of disturbance caused by deals in Mau-
ritius, The Gambia and Senegal.
These results highlight the high potential of negative local
impacts in six of the seven countries (except Morocco) where land
acquisitions were found to potentially contribute to food security
and they only seem to cause low conflicts in two (Egypt and
Namibia) of the 14 countries with unclear impacts on food security
(Fig. 3a, Table S2). Moreover, while the targeted areas remain rel-
atively small (less than 1% of total national land area in most of the
countries) at the scale of the countries that host them, they still
have the potential to impact 5.3 million people in the continent,
which corresponds to the entire population of Norway (Fig. 3b).
Targeted areas were also home to over 5% of the rural population
of South Africa, Mozambique, Ghana, Sierra Leone, Liberia and
STP and more than half of that of the Congo in 2000. Even where
deals would pose relatively low conflicts, such as in Morocco,
Sudan and Egypt, the acquired land was large enough to potentially
impact up to 70,000 people either through dispossession or reduc-
tion in available natural resources to use, if the entire planned LSLA
area was operationalized for production (Fig. 3). As such, Namibia
emerges as the only country where LSLA would negatively impact
the least people (less than a 1000) and which contribution to food
security is potentially positive (unclear) based on our results
(Fig. 3).crops and investors involved under the most likely scenario –Table 2). (b) Ability of
s’ needs – Fig. 1b – and the most likely markets targeted by deals – Fig. 2a).
Fig. 3. (a) Potential levels of land pressures resulting from LSLA in the regions where they occur overlayed on top of the potential deals’ contribution to food security (Fig. 2b).
Pie charts represent the proportion of acquired land area affected by each level of pressure (Table 3). (b) Number of potentially impacted people by LSLA based on the acquired
area and the population density (CIESIN, 2016) of the regions where deals occur.
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We find that in the year 2000, over 65% of the 38 African coun-
tries where land deals occurred were limited with respect to at
least one food security dimension (discarding utilization) and
could benefit from investments (Fig. 1). However, only nine of
them received investments potentially fitting their food security
needs (Fig. 2b). Moreover, in 34 countries, these deals occurred
in densely populated, agricultural or forested regions (Fig. 3a). This
means that they have a high likelihood of increasing pressures on
land, potentially resulting in conflicts as well as deforestation.
Therefore, current LSLA do not seem to address the food security
needs of the African countries that host them in a sustainable
manner.
In the following section, we further discuss these results by first
engaging with debates regarding the identification of priority food
security needs of countries. We bring to light the extent to which
LSLA and food security needs mismatch in the continent. We then
look into the ways LSLAs impact local populations, where nutrition
security, infrastructure needs, social and political stability and
environmental degradation are not considered as priorities in
investment decisions. Finally, we explain how LSLA can be under-
stood and analyzed as stemming from a neo-extractivist logic
rather than one seeking to secure food.4.1. The multi-dimensionality of food security
4.1.1. Centering accessibility and marginalized groups
Agricultural programs and investments for achieving food secu-
rity have been mainly focused on increasing agricultural produc-
tion, i.e. availability, and have largely ignored accessibility issues.
As a matter of fact, Clapp and Murphy (2013) argue that policies
directed towards hunger eradication by the G20 are still prioritiz-
ing the availability aspect of food security. Yet, it has been shown
since the 1980s (Sen, 1981) that people’s ability to access food is a
major determinant in eradicating hunger, and that ‘‘having enough7
food to feed a population within a country’s borders, or even glob-
ally, is no guarantee that everyone will be well fed” (Clapp, 2015, p.
2). Our results show that for 28 countries with sufficient food avail-
able, 22 present levels of undernourishment and 3 of severe
undernourishment (Fig. 1).
In order to tackle hunger and malnutrition, it is important to
focus hunger eradication efforts on the most vulnerable groups
within society such as indigenous peoples, women, children, rural
populations, and poorer populations (Fonjong & Gyapong, 2021;
German & Parker, 2019; Von Grebmer et al., 2017). The 2017 Glo-
bal Hunger Index (GHI) report (2017) argues that food insecurity is
nowadays driven by unequal distribution of power and resources,
rather than a lack of quantity of food produced. Such inequalities
can materialize from within the smallest societal structure, for
example through the correlation between gender inequality and
malnutrition within poor households, to the impact that large
transnational food companies have on food policies at various eco-
nomic, political, and administrative levels (Fonjong & Gyapong,
2021). The level of inequalities within countries could explain the
difference in prevalence of undernourishment between countries
with similar poverty incidence. However, just like Clapp’s (2015)
critique, the GHI report (2017) also shows that current develop-
ment initiatives still do not address the structural issues underly-
ing food and hunger problems.4.1.2. Self-sufficiency versus import capacity debates
Food trade has been increasingly encouraged and favored at the
global scale either due to the vulnerability of production to cli-
matic shocks, or in the continuation of the liberalization policies
of the 1980s (Clapp, 2015, 2017; Pirkle, Poliquin, Sia, Kouakou, &
Sagna, 2014; World Bank, 2007). As such, the notion of compara-
tive advantage has pushed many African economies to rely on
the export of a few commodities, mostly fuel, minerals, and
selected cash crops such as cotton, coffee, and cacao (Clapp,
2017; Pirkle et al., 2014). This resulted in a neglect of the agricul-
tural sector by African governments and has turned many
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between 1960 and 2000 (Clapp, 2017).
Such import dependence for food security has been problema-
tized after the 2008 food crisis when food prices skyrocketed
(UNCTAD, 2019a). Indeed the combination of the food and financial
crises have shed light on the fragility of trade systems and the dan-
gers of an over-financialization of agriculture (Anseeuw, Roda, &
Ducastel, 2017; Clapp & Helleiner, 2010; De Schutter, 2011a;
Genoud, 2018). This has brought the issue of self-sufficiency and
food sovereignty back in international policy debates (Clapp,
2017). Food sovereignty is centered on improving self-sufficiency
especially for smallholder farmers, following agro-ecological farm-
ing practices, and respecting food and land rights (Burnett &
Murphy, 2014; Clapp, 2015). However, while trade cannot be con-
sidered an exclusive or sustainable way of securing food, it can’t be
ignored either as most people, including farmers, rely on markets
for their livelihoods (Clapp, 2015), and international food trade
currently meets the nutritional needs of hundreds of millions of
people globally (Wood, Smith, Fanzo, Remans, & Defries, 2018).
4.2. The capacity of land deals to address the identified food security
needs
Our results highlight the mismatch between countries’ needs
and land deals’ intentions in 14 of the studied countries
(Fig. 2b). This is particularly concerning for countries like Ethiopia,
Congo and CAR that face alarming levels of undernourishment, due
in part to their limited food supplies, and receive deals mostly
intended for export markets or for producing oils and sugars that
could be used for feed, biofuel and electricity production rather
than for food (Anseeuw et al., 2012; Borras et al., 2014; Zoomers,
2010). Even in countries where LSLA are mostly supplying local
food markets, it is unclear if and how this production would reach
the people who are undernourished due to physical, economic or
social inaccessibility. Moreover, deals where the production is
intended for export in countries requiring an improvement in their
self-sufficiency such as Eswatini and Senegal, face the risk of per-
petuating a dependence on volatile commodities which may per-
petuate negative food security consequences in the long term
(Burchardt & Dietz, 2014; Clapp, 2017; UNCTAD, 2019a).
Our results are however less clear for the countries that we iden-
tified should prioritize investments in accessibility or utilization. In
terms of utilization, Nolte et al. (2016) explain that it is not uncom-
mon that some investors make the deliberate choice of investing in
community infrastructure such as health, education, irrigation, or
road infrastructure. However, such investments are up to the dis-
cretion of the investor, andmight often primarily benefit the invest-
ment company itself rather than the local community (Nolte et al.,
2016). More so, LSLA often target locations with fertile agricultural
land with easy water access for irrigation and as such are not
intended to promote rural development (Glover & Jones, 2019;
Lay & Nolte, 2018; McMichael, 2012). Our findings also support this
idea, as we find that 48% of the acquired land targets previous crop-
lands and 56% is located in accessible regions (Fig. S5).
In theory, accessibility could be improved by LSLA if they
increase income through job creation. Behrman et al. (2012) argue
that if LSLA are executed in a socially responsible and inclusive
way, they could have a transformative potential on the localities
they settle into through job creation, income generation and the
introduction of new services and technologies. Previous studies
found evidence of positive spillover effects of LSLA on income
and technology transfer within the communities where deals occur
as well as their closest neighbors (Deininger & Xia, 2016; Glover &
Jones, 2019; Van den Broeck, Van Hoyweghen, & Maertens, 2018).
For example, as a result of increased incomes from biofuel sales,
the productivity has been improved in small-scale farms in Ethio-8
pia (Negash & Swinnen, 2013). In Mozambique, the extent of
effects varies based on the types of contracts and crops planted
as out-grower schemes focused on high value crops seem to have
more positive effects than those aimed at producing bulk com-
modities in terms of employment opportunities and market access
(Deininger & Xia, 2016; Glover & Jones, 2019). Moreover, the hor-
ticultural export market in Senegal has been associated with both
an increase in the import capacity of the country, ensuring suffi-
cient food availability, but also contributed to higher income for
women, resulting in higher nutritional value of consumed foods
in their households (Van den Broeck et al., 2018). In Western
Mount Kenya, Zaehringer et al. (2018) show that the expectation
of income opportunities through employment was the main posi-
tive spillover of LSLA mentioned by the local population.
However, while continental scale assessment is difficult, there
are a number of concerns as to the capacity of LSLA to effectively cre-
ate higher income and sustainable jobs. A discrepancy appears
between the potentiality and expectation of LSLA to create jobs –
both from investors and local populations– and their actual capacity
to do so in reality. Gyapong (2020), for instance, explains that even
though the existence of LSLA is not questioned or resisted within
some communities in Ghana, there is still a general frustration from
local populations because their expectations – based on verbal pro-
mises made prior to the investments – in terms of employment
quantity and quality have not been met. In the study previously
mentioned conducted in Kenya, Zaehringer et al. (2018) show that
despite these assumptions, only one-third of the respondent house-
holds have or had a member employed by LSLA, and the employ-
ment they provide mostly generates additional income to mitigate
crop failures for example, insofar as it is seasonal and unstable.
Furthemore, several studies have shown that LSLA have a nega-
tive impact on employment quantity and quality (seasonal and low
paid), and on socio-economic equality (Bottazzi, Crespo, Omar, &
Rist, 2018; German & Parker, 2019; Lanz, Gerber, & Haller, 2018;
Li, 2011; Oberlack et al., 2016; Shete & Rutten, 2015; Zoomers,
2010). For instance, Li (2011) unveiled a discrepancy between
the World Bank’s reports in terms of employment and field data.
Against a claimed 1.7–3 million jobs created on 6 million hectares
in palm oil production, in reality only 0.6–1.5 million workers were
employed (Li, 2011). Moreover, even in cases where employment is
created, providing relatively high income (Herrmann, 2017), it
might only be attributed to the initial phases of LSLA projects (Li,
2011; McMichael, 2012; Nolte et al., 2016; Oberlack et al., 2016).
LSLA-based employment can also negatively impact food security,
as jobs are diverted from small and mid-sized farms, which often-
times results in lower yields on private farms (Bottazzi et al.,
2018). LSLA employment also tends to increase income inequalities
between genders, age groups, classes and races or ethnicities as
various forms of discrimination are often associated with LSLA
employment terms (Behrman et al., 2012; Borras & Franco, 2012;
Bottazzi et al., 2018; German & Parker, 2019; Lanz et al., 2018;
Yengoh & Armah, 2015).
All the above arguments question the capacity of LSLA to ade-
quately and securely address countries’ food security needs, from
cash crops and export-led investments in countries with availabil-
ity needs, to the optional investments in infrastructure in countries
with utilization needs. The capacity of LSLA to address countries’
accessibility needs is a difficult one to assess. Assuming that acces-
sibility is in big parts addressed by income generation through job
creation, there is evidence that the expectation of increased
employment is one of the most important positive spillover effects
of LSLA. Nevertheless, localized studies by country show discrep-
ancies between promised employment opportunities and actually
generated income, especially for marginalized groups and
communities. Benefits from LSLA are not consistent across deals
and are generally limited to specific communities (Deininger &
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under-investments in rural and farming communities, and run
the risk of increasing already existing inequalities within and
across communities as we argue in the next sub-section.
4.3. Local implications of LSLA
Beyond direct indicators of food security used in this study,
LSLA have other impacts on populations’ livelihoods that affect
the extent to which they are food secure. Oberlack et al (2016)
have identified archetypes of livelihood vulnerability describing
the processes by which LSLAs are established and their respective
implications on livelihoods in the regions in which they occur. The
most common archetypes they identified are asset enclosure, elite
capture, selective marginalization, and polarization of develop-
ment discourses (Oberlack et al., 2016). They found that enclosures
are more prevalent in transnational investments and have the most
negative outcomes on local populations, while elite capture targets
very large deals and results in negative impacts for disadvantaged
populations. Finally discourse polarization is often associated with
domestic or mixed investments targeting flex crops and result in
increased conflicts (Oberlack et al., 2016). Our results show that
transnational investments represent 62% of the acquired land in
the continent and domestic or mixed investments on flex crops
account for 19% of acquired land (Fig. S1, Fig. S2). Following this
logic, negative impacts with high probability of conflicts are likely
to occur in 81% of acquired land, which is close to the 90% we found
based on the results of Fig. 3a.
These four archetypes of livelihood vulnerability have resulted
in various forms of dispossession of land owners or users from
access to natural resources, with the main differences being
whether the dispossession is generalized or targeted against
groups of people (Lanz et al., 2018; McMichael, 2012; Oberlack
et al., 2016). For example, Fonjong and Gyapong (2021) found that
women, pastoralist and indigenous people were most often dis-
placed due to LSLA, leading to further food insecurity and
marginalization of these already vulnerable groups. The resulting
displacement of people has led to higher population densities in
more remote and/or less fertile areas, thus pushing people further
into poverty and hunger (Bottazzi et al., 2018; Nolte et al., 2016;
Oberlack et al., 2016). Our results show that this could apply to
up to 5.3 million people across Africa (Fig. 3).
Similarly, the loss of grasslands, which represents 5% of acquired
land in our study (Fig. S5), has had major implications on the liveli-
hoods of both smallholders and herders in Ghana and Ethiopia
(Lanz et al., 2018; Shete & Rutten, 2015). As the area for grazing
shrank, they lost cattle – used for ploughing and/or for dairy pro-
duction – and substituted them with smaller ruminants (Shete &
Rutten, 2015). Shrinking resources have also led to conflicts
between old and new comers as well as with pastoralists (Akov,
2017; Oberlack et al., 2016). Deforestation is also likely to occur
as a result of agricultural land deals’ clearing of large tracts of for-
ests on 2.7 MHa, representing 31% of acquired land in the continent
(Fig. S5). This is particularly relevant for flex crops that replaced 58%
of cleared forested land (Fig. S6). These results are consistent with
the findings of Davis et al. (2020) associating LSLA with high defor-
estation rates in tropical areas and particularly for areas under palm
oil, wood fiber and tree plantations. Such significant forest loss then
leads to loss of biomass, erosion and increased greenhouse gas
emissions (Chen, Kennedy, & Xu, 2019; Conigliani et al., 2018;
Fairhead et al., 2015; Oberlack et al., 2016; Zaehringer et al., 2018).
4.4. Alternative framing for LSLA beyond food security
We have shown that LSLAs are not addressing the food security
needs of the countries in which they occur. Rather, the push for9
LSLA seems to echo the focus on increased production and export
in development discourses (Clapp & Murphy, 2013; Oberlack
et al., 2016). The frequent shortcomings of increased production
alone to achieve food security raise questions about the underlying
political economic logics behind LSLAs. Part of the explanation was
shown by previous studies to be found in the neoliberal logic of
financializing food markets, commodifying land, and increasing
commodity dependence of host economies, all for financial gain
from transnational companies or domestic elites at the expense
of local populations (Akram-Lodhi, 2015; Anseeuw et al., 2017;
Burch & Lawrence, 2009; Clapp & Helleiner, 2010; Cotula et al.,
2009; De Schutter, 2011a; McMichael, 2012). This is especially
apparent when considering that 25% of the land acquired in the
continent was by financial institutions (Fig. S2) that could be spec-
ulating on land, food and fuel markets without producing any
crops (Anseeuw et al., 2017; Borras et al., 2014; Hertel, 2017;
Sorda et al., 2010). Therefore, a rhetoric that justifies LSLA as a
way to meet food security concerns is not well supported by evi-
dence (Lay & Nolte, 2018; Oberlack et al., 2016).
Furthermore, domestic State actors are responsible for facilitat-
ing LSLAs by fostering an environment prone to these types of
investments (Bottazzi et al., 2018; Lanz et al., 2018; Oberlack
et al., 2016) even if they are only directly involved in 10% of the
acquired land (Fig. S2). Thus, we further postulate that LSLAs could
be conceptualized as neo-extractivist. Neo-extractivism is a con-
cept that refers to neoliberal policies that give the State an impor-
tant role in regulating the use, appropriation and distribution of
natural resources (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). This paradigm is
argued to be beneficial in the sense that nation-States can generate
revenue through the intensification of the exploitation of natural
resources and raw materials, and market liberalization of export-
led economies (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). According to the neo-
extractivist understanding, this surplus would be reinvested by
the State in development and the expansion of social structures
(Burchardt & Dietz, 2014). As such, in theory, the State is a crucial
player ensuring sovereignty, food security, development, and social
and political stability, thus securing the livelihood of the popula-
tion and the sovereignty of the country (Deonandan &
Dougherty, 2016).
In practice, however, the economic and socio-ecological bene-
fits and drawbacks of natural resource extraction are unequally
distributed (Burchardt & Dietz, 2014; Nolte & Ostermeier, 2017).
More so, neo-extractivism has also been associated with rent-
seeking activities (rents, quotas, or licenses) only benefiting elites
(Acosta, 2013; Baland & Francois, 2000; Bhattacharyya & Hodler,
2010; Lanz et al., 2018; Ogwang & Vanclay, 2019), thus reproduc-
ing the existing unequal power dynamics at a national and global
level (Holden & Otsuka, 2014). Such inequalities can potentially
lead to corruption and hinder economic growth (Baland &
Francois, 2000; Bhattacharyya & Hodler, 2010) rather than foster-
ing agricultural or rural development programs (FAO, 2015;
Pirkle et al., 2014). Further in-depth and widely distributed field-
based research would be needed to explicitly determine the extent
to which LSLAs serve national elites and corporate wealth accumu-
lation as opposed to local populations. Such study should engage
with the full network of actors involved and impacted by LSLAs
to assess the different ways in which they benefit from them.5. Uncertainties and limitations
We acknowledge that our results are dependent on the food
security indicators and thresholds chosen. The choice of indicators
was limited by data availability and attempted to follow FAO’s
guidelines for food security measurements. However rigid thresh-
olds could lead to overestimations or underestimations of the food
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95% for caloric availability means that Central African Republic
(91%) is considered as having limited food availability while
Mozambique (95%) is considered as having sufficient food avail-
able. Similarly, the constructed affordability index might be over-
estimated as it does not account for price fluctuations or
different periods during which farmers have access to their own
produced food. Yet, even with such a generous measure, a large
proportion of countries remain limited in terms of accessibility
(14 countries in the year 2000).
The safety and nutritional value of the food consumed are also
difficult to estimate due to the complexity of the data that needs to
be gathered, such as nutrient intake based on physical and health
attributes of individuals, food safety throughout the value chain,
and water quality and safety (WHO, 2003). Therefore, even though
it is not holistic, this study relied on FAO’s utilization indicators
that only focus on access to safe water sources and sanitation facil-
ities (FAO IFAD & WFP, 2013; United Nations, 2016). Moreover, in
relation to nutrition, the recent LANCET report offers guidelines for
healthy ranges of different food groups, including the lower bound-
ary of 300 g/day/capita for fruits and vegetables, as opposed to the
400 g that we have used (Willett et al., 2019). Following this less
stringent guideline would mean that more countries could be con-
sidered able to provide a healthy diet to their population such as
Ghana, Côte d’Ivoire, Nigeria and Mauritius.
The methods used in order to estimate the potential of deals to
contribute to food security are all data driven and as such are lim-
ited by data availability and reliability. Moreover, there might be
issues relating to the lack of information on the amount of land
allocated to each crop group in multi-crop deals, which cover
55% of the studied acquired land in the continent which could
change our results. Yet, since in single crop deals a larger propor-
tion of land is used for high value cash and flex crops than for food
crops, we would assume that it is more likely for investors to allo-
cate more land to these crops. Further research based on more
detailed data would be required to test this hypothesis.
Finally, we have attempted to assess the potential local impacts
of LSLA based on characteristics of the regions where they occur.
Due to the lack of exact coordinates available for all deals, this
was done using averages and majority filters within a 10Km buffer
and at district level. These results are also dependent on the accu-
racy of the ready-made products used (population density, land
cover and accessibility).6. Conclusion
We have developed a framework to identify the priority food
security needs of 38 African countries that could be used to guide
food security related investments in each studied country, as well
as others. We have analyzed the types of Large-Scale Land Acquisi-
tion deals for the studied African countries and found that the
countries’ food security needs rarely matched the types of LSLA
in place. Moreover, we also find that LSLA generally lead to nega-
tive local impacts even in the countries where they do not oppose
food security needs. By targeting previous croplands and densely
populated agricultural areas, mostly for the production of flex
crops, while food crops are allocated to more marginal lands, LSLA
oftentimes risk population displacement, loss of livelihood and
increase the potential of land related conflicts, further aggravating
food insecurity. We also found that LSLAs can lead to deforestation,
potentially contributing to land degradation and carbon emissions
in large areas across the continent. While our analysis does not
allow for a large scale assessment of potential positive impacts
from LSLAs in terms of job creation and increased income, previous
studies have highlighted that when such opportunities are created10– and not only expected or presumed – the number of people
accessing them is relatively small. Moreover, these benefits often
take the form of very tedious seasonal job or target few skilled
workers. But oftentimes, such benefits hardly make up for the neg-
ative impacts in terms of health and environment. Therefore, in
practice, we show that LSLAs often fail to serve a food security
agenda, and hypothesize that they may instead serve economic
and financial gains for investors and national elites at the expense
of poor and marginalized groups.
This study thus suggests that current LSLAs are not appropriate
to serve food security in the continent. Instead, they follow a neo-
extractivist logic prioritizing financial gain over socio-ecological
benefits. In this study our findings conclude that food security
needs have not been properly addressed. Therefore, in order to bet-
ter serve this purpose, agricultural investments should be tailored
to the priorities of each country, and developed together with cur-
rent farming communities to ensure they are implemented in a
responsible, sustainable, pro-poor, gender-sensitive manner and
inclusive of marginalized communities so as to support the
socio-ecological systems in which they occur. Furthermore, large
deals targeting forest lands, as well as those displacing large agri-
cultural communities should be avoided, particularly when they
are meant for export markets in countries with already high preva-
lence of undernourishment.
Insuring food security should not arbitrarily equate increasing
unsustainable LSLA, but rather needs to explicitly address the mul-
tidimensionality of food security and the systemic failures to
achieving it in any given context.
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